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Abstract
Background: Decentering, a central change strategy of Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy, is a process of
stepping outside of one’s own mental events leading to an objective and non-judging stance towards the self. The
study aimed at investigating associated mechanisms of decentering.
Method: The present study investigated the relation of decentering, operationalized by means of the German
Version of the Experiences Questionnaire, to severity of depressive symptoms, assessed by the adaptive Rasch-based
depression screening, and self-focussed attention, assessed by the Questionnaire of Dysfunctional and Functional
Self-Consciousness. Furthermore, the relationship between decentering and a) the ability to shift and allocate
attention by means of the Stroop test, and b) metacognitive monitoring, i.e. the absolute difference between
judged and real task performance, was investigated. These relationships were examined in 55 healthy students
using Pearson’s correlations.
Results: In line with our assumptions, higher decentering scores were significantly associated with lower scores
on severity of depressive symptoms, with higher functional- and lower dysfunctional self-focussed attention.
Contrary to our expectations, results neither indicated a relationship between decentering and attention ability,
nor between decentering and metacognitive monitoring.
Conclusions: The present results suggest that decentering is associated with concepts of mental health (i.e. less
severity of depressive symptoms and higher functional self-focussed attention). Overall, the concept decentering
seems to be mainly composed of self-focussed aspects when investigated in a healthy sample without intervention.
Further investigations of associated concepts of decentering should consider aspects of self-relevance and emotional
valence.
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Background
Decentering is described as ‘a process through which one
is able to step outside of one’s immediate experience,
thereby changing the very nature of that experience’
(Safran and Segal 1990, p. 117). Through this objective ob-
serving from a distanced perspective by stepping outside
of one’s own mental events, people are enabled to realize
that their mental events are no unchangeable truth, but
only a constructed reality of the self. This decentered shift
in perspective facilitates that a person non-judgmentally
accepts the own mental events as what they are, thus as
just a thought or an experience. It was examined that the
shift in perspective and adaptive stance enhances self-
regulation, entails more appropriate reactions to own
cognitions, and reduces dysfunctional attitudes towards
the own person (Ong et al. 2012; Tanay et al. 2012).
The reorientation of attention on thoughts at the present
moment, while simultaneously not focussing on its content,
is characterized by cognitive flexibility and self-focussed
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attention (Bishop et al. 2004; Garland et al. 2011; Ortner et
al. 2007; Troy et al. 2012). To sum up, the focus of decen-
tering lies on a shift in perspective, changing the relation-
ship towards the self and inner experiences, leading to a
more objective and non-judging stance towards the self, and
not on changing the particular content of mental events
(Ong et al. 2012).
Generally, decentering is viewed as a necessary concept
for mental health and a healthy development, whereas the
absence of this ability leads to psychological and social
dysfunction (Fresco et al. 2007a). Research in healthy indi-
viduals suggests that there are habitual interindividual dif-
ferences in the decentering ability (Feldman et al. 2010;
Fresco et al. 2007a; Kahan and Sullivan 2012; Tanay et al.
2012). Although much is known about the beneficial effect
of decentering on mental health, the specific processes
that are associated with interindividual differences in
decentering in healthy subjects remain to be elucidated.
The concept decentering is mainly discussed in the
context of mindfulness. There are diverse conceptualisa-
tions of mindfulness in the literature (Bishop et al. 2004;
Kabat-Zinn 1994; Langer and Moldoveanu 2000), which
seem not to be mutually exclusive, but rather overlapping
and only differing in focus (for an overview of conceptual-
izations, see Pagnini and Philips 2015). In an approach by
Langer, a mindful state includes an open and new per-
spective on every novel situation, not relying on prior
automatic categories (Langer and Moldoveanu 2000;
Pagnini and Philips 2015). Additionally, other researchers
postulate that mindfulness means paying attention in
the present moment, on purpose and non-judgmentally,
which includes non-involvement of emotional assessment
(Kabat-Zinn 1994; Pagnini and Philips 2015). Bishop et al.
(2004) stress the aspect of attention regulation and an
accepting and open orientation on one’s experiences when
conceptualizing mindfulness. Generally, being mindful by
having an open state of mind is assumed to enhance
cognitive flexibility, which implies the ability to interrupt
automated responses and rather responding non-habitually
(Carson and Langer 2006; Garland et al. 2011; Moore and
Malinowski 2009; Troy et al. 2012). This form of flexible
information processing is assumed to result in health-re-
lated outcomes (Pagnini and Philips 2015). Decenter-
ing, as is the concept focussed on in the present study,
is known as one central mechanism of change in
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) (Feldman
et al. 2010; Gecht et al. 2014a; Hick and Chan 2010;
Ong et al. 2012; Ortner et al. 2007; Segal et al. 2002;
Semple and Burke 2011; Shapiro et al. 2006; Tanay et al.
2012) and has been predominantly investigated in clinical
samples. MBCT is one prominent therapy approach
within the third wave of cognitive behaviour therapy
(CBT; Hayes 2004). Several studies revealed that MBCT
is effective in preventing depressive relapse for remitted
patients (for a review see Fjorback et al. 2011), and in
reducing symptoms of currently depressed patients
(Barnhofer et al. 2009; Kenny and Williams 2007; Kingston
et al. 2007; Van Aalderen et al. 2012). Additionally, several
studies demonstrated the effectiveness of mindfulness-
based interventions for the reduction of symptoms in di-
verse physical and mental health problems in clinical as
well as non-clinical samples (for reviews see Grossman et
al. 2004; Keng et al. 2011). It has been found that patients’
decentering ability can be enhanced through CBT and
MBCT (Bieling et al. 2012; Carmody et al. 2009; Fresco
et al. 2007b; Fresco et al. 2011; Hick and Chan 2010; Se-
gal et al. 2002; Teasdale et al. 2002). Furthermore, it could
be demonstrated that depressive patients have a lower
decentering ability than healthy control subjects (Teasdale
et al. 2002), and that decentering is negatively associated
with depressive patients’ relapse rate after therapy
(Fresco et al. 2007b; Teasdale et al. 2002).
Interestingly, the influence of mindfulness-based inter-
ventions on cognitive processing was experimentally ex-
amined (e.g. Alberts and Thewissen 2011; Anderson et al.
2007; Chambers et al. 2008; Jha et al. 2007; Ortner et al.
2007; Van den Hurk et al. 2012; Wenk-Sormaz 2005; for a
review see Van der Velden et al. 2015), whereas, to our
knowledge, investigations of specific psychological mecha-
nisms underlying decentering remain spare. This is
surprising since decentering is regarded as a central mech-
anism of change in psychotherapy. Hence, it would be of
great practical importance to clarify the psychological cor-
relates of interindividual differences in decentering. Know-
ledge about mechanisms associated with interindividual
differences in decentering would be important for the de-
velopment of psychotherapy or health interventions that
would train these special processes to further increase
therapy outcome and a healthy functioning.
The conceptualization of decentering as a metacogni-
tive strategy (e.g. see Bernstein et al. 2015; Garland et al.
2011; Lebois et al. 2015; Troy et al. 2012) allows to focus
on the following aspects within decentering that might
vary interindividually: In a decentered state people are
ought to be able to a) allocate attention on own mental
events, while b) simultaneously only observing and not
focussing on its content (Bishop et al. 2004; Garland et
al. 2011; Ortner et al. 2007; Troy et al. 2012).
First, a) cognitive resources like the ability to shift and
allocate attention appear to be an important prerequisite
for decentering. Lutz et al. (2008) reported that through
focussed attention meditation, as used in MBCT, peoples’
sustained and selective attention could be enhanced. Fur-
thermore, studies revealed that the inhibition of automatic
responses is enhanced by meditation. It could be demon-
strated that meditators, in comparison to non-meditators
or participants receiving no meditation practice, showed a
reduction in habitual responding on the Stroop test,
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i.e. reacted with less interference when trying to pre-
vent an automated response of reading words instead of
ignoring word content, but only naming the colour of
written words (for a detailed task description see e.g.
Moore and Malinowski 2009 or the method section of
the present paper) (Moore and Malinowski 2009;
Wenk-Sormaz 2005). Ortner et al. (2007) found that
people with experience in mindfulness meditation showed a
reduced interference effect on the emotional interference task.
Moreover, Lebois et al. (2015) investigated that decentering
ability was enhanced by mindful attention intervention.
Second, after allocating attention to one’s own thoughts,
by definition decentered people are ought to have b)
metacognitive abilities to observe, respectively monitor
these thoughts purposefully and non-judgmentally. In this
respect, it can be assumed that decentering and metacog-
nitive monitoring might be associated. Metacognitive
monitoring is defined as the subjective assessment of one’s
own cognitions and knowledge, represented by informa-
tion flow from a lower object-level to a higher meta-level
necessary for adapting behaviour (Koriat and Shitzer-
Reichert 2002; Nelson and Narens 1990). Specifically,
researchers postulate that metacognitive monitoring pro-
cesses of own thoughts lead to a decentered perspective
(Allen et al. 2006; Garland et al. 2011; Segal et al. 2002,
2013). As it is known that depressive patients are impaired
in their decentering ability, some support for the above
described assumption that decentering might be related to
metacognitive monitoring can additionally be derived
from research findings on depressive patients. Depressed
people showed impaired metacognitive monitoring abilities
compared to partially remitted patients and control subjects
(Sheppard and Teasdale 2004; Slife and Weaver 1992).
Metacognitive monitoring ability is typically assessed by
means of metacognitive judgments, in which people are
asked to judge their own cognitive performance (judgment
of performance, JOP) (for an overview see Koriat 2007).
Subsequently, these JOPs are compared to the real task per-
formance by means of the absolute difference between
these two scores (e.g. Slife and Weaver 1992).
The present study aimed at investigating the relation
of decentering to severity of depressive symptoms, self-
focussed attention, as well as the ability to shift and allo-
cate attention and metacognitive monitoring in a sample
of healthy subjects. We hypothesized that a higher decen-
tering ability will be associated with less severe depressive
symptoms and with lower dysfunctional and higher func-
tional self-focussed attention. Furthermore, we hypothe-
sized that people scoring higher on decentering will also
show a higher ability to shift and allocate attention and a
higher metacognitive monitoring ability. In addition, it is
assumable that variance in decentering among healthy
participants is smaller than in previous studies comparing
healthy controls with depressed patients. Therefore, we
hypothesized that analyses of low and high decentering
groups would probably indicate hidden effects of the
above hypothesized associated processes.
Method
Participants
The sample of the study consisted of 55 healthy students
from RWTH Aachen University, who did not suffer from
any physical or mental illness. Participants’ mean age was
24 ± 3 years (range 18–32) and most of them were female
(69 %). The majority of participants were medical students
(35 %), followed by psychology (20 %) and engineering
(18 %). Exclusion criteria for participation were suffering
from mental illnesses, insufficient command of the
German language, colour vision deficiency, and dyslexia.
All participants received a financial compensation for their
participation. Approval for the study was provided by the




As a measure of decentering the EQ-D (Gecht et al.
2014b) was used. The EQ-D is a German version of the
Experiences Questionnaire (EQ; Fresco et al. 2007a).
The EQ-D consists of 8 questions assessed on a 5-point
Likert scale (0 = never, 4 = always). The questionnaire in-
cludes two subscales consisting of four items each. Con-
sequently, for each subscale scores can range from 0 to
16. One subscale represents the decentering aspect of
‘accepting self-perception’ (ASP) (e.g. ‘I can accept my-
self as I am’). The other subscale represents the decen-
tering aspect of ‘distanced perspective’ (DP) (e.g. ‘I can
separate myself from my thoughts and feelings’). The
four items of each of the two subscales were combined
and summed up into a single index for each subscale
(ASP: Cronbach’s α = 0.70; DP: Cronbach’s α = 0.70).1
Higher scores indicated a higher ability of the respective
aspect of decentering. Psychometric analyses of the EQ-D
by Gecht et al. (2014b) revealed adequate construct valid-
ity. Note that the full 20-item-version of the original EQ
(Fresco et al. 2007a) was administered as it is recom-
mended by Gecht et al. (2014b).
Depressive symptoms
As a measure of severity of depressive symptoms, the
adaptive Rasch-based depression screening (A-DESC)
was used (Forkmann et al. 2009; Forkmann et al. 2013).
The A-DESC is a well-validated instrument to assess
the severity of depressive symptoms and may also be
used as a screening tool by applying the cut-off scores
provided (Forkmann et al. 2009; Forkmann et al. 2013).
Participants were asked to answer 36 items on a 5-point
Likert scale (0 = never, 4 = always), Cronbach’s α = 0.941.
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Lower scores indicated less severity of depressive symp-
toms. The A-DESC showed adequate criterion validity
(Forkmann et al. 2013).
Self-focussed attention
As a measure of self-focussed attention, the Questionnaire
of Dysfunctional and Functional Self-Consciousness (DFS;
Hoyer 2000) was used. This questionnaire includes one
subscale measuring dysfunctional self-focussed attention,
consisting of 14 items (e.g. ‘Once I start thinking about a
problem I cannot stop easily’), Cronbach’s α = 0.911. The
other subscale of the questionnaire measures functional
self-focussed attention, consisting of eight items (e.g. ‘I am
confident of being able to solve a personal problem, even
if there is no solution in sight at the beginning’), Cron-
bach’s α = 0.771. Each item is assessed on a 5-point Likert
scale (0 = absolutely not applicable, 4 = absolutely applic-
able). The DFS showed adequate psychometric properties
(Hoyer 2000).
Attention task
As a measure of shifting and allocating attention, the
German version of the Stroop test was used (Bäumler
1985). This test assesses selective and executive attention
by measuring inhibitory processes. This task was admin-
istered in form of a paper-and-pencil test using a stop-
watch. Participants are asked to name colours while
simultaneously suppressing automatic reading processes,
which requires cognitive flexibility. The test consisted of
three different task types of increasing difficulty. First,
participants had to read the words “red”, “green”, “yellow”
and “blue” written in black ink (Colour Word Reading,
CWR). Second, participants had to name the colour of
control patches, which means for example naming “yellow”
when a yellow patch is presented (Colour Patches Naming,
CPN). In this task type there were no written words, only
colour patches. Third, participants had to name the incon-
gruent colour of colour words, for example naming red
when the word ‘green’ was written in red ink (Interference,
INT). Participants were instructed to read the words or
name the colours as fast and accurate as possible. Partici-
pants had to perform three trials. Completion time (time
from naming the first item until naming the last one of
each page, respectively each subtask) was recorded in
seconds with a stopwatch. Interference refers to the decre-
ment in performance for the incongruent task (INT) in
comparison to only naming colours, and is calculated as
the difference in reaction time between INT and CPN
(MacLeod 1991). The higher the difference between the
two tasks is, the higher is the interference and the lower
the ability to shift and allocate attention. For the purpose
of the present study, the mean reaction time of INT as
well as mean Interference was included in the analyses.
For further details on this method, see Kessel et al. (2014).
Metacognitive monitoring
Participants’ ability to monitor their own performance in
the attention task was assessed by metacognitive judg-
ments of performance (JOPs). Participants were asked to
judge after the subtasks of the Stroop test the time (in
seconds) they needed to perform the task (completion
time). As index for the metacognitive monitoring ability,
the absolute difference between judged and real perform-
ance was calculated, representing absolute monitoring ac-
curacy (Mengelkamp and Bannert 2009). The absolute
difference score is a common measure used for assessing
absolute judgment accuracy respectively congruence be-
tween these two values and represents the magnitude of
judgment error from the true score (see e.g. Edwards
1994; Holmbeck et al. 2002; Mengelkamp and Bannert
2009; Schraw and Roedel 1994). The smaller this differ-
ence is, the higher is the accuracy respectively the moni-
toring ability. In order to ensure that the judgments were
based on internal monitoring processes, no feedback of
task performance was provided. For further details on this
method, see Kessel et al. (2014). For the purpose of the
present study, the mean absolute differences between
judged and real task performance regarding completion
time of INT were included in the analyses, as this is the
measure used for the assessment of the ability to shift and
allocate attention.
Procedure
Participants were recruited via notices in different depart-
ments of the university. A telephone interview was con-
ducted before the individual examination in order to check
exclusion criteria, and to acquire general demographic in-
formation. At the day of the examination in the laboratory,
participants were given general information about the ex-
perimental procedure, and they provided written informed
consent. Then, a clinical screening interview based on the
International Diagnostic Checklist (ICDL; Hiller et al.
1997) for depression was conducted in order to check for
absence of a depressive disorder. After this, participants
were asked to fill in the questionnaires and to conduct the
attention task, including the JOPs after each subtask.
Statistical analysis
All data was analyzed in SPSS 20.0. Adequate sample
size was calculated with G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al. 2007). An
a priori power analysis for t-tests/Correlation/two-tailed
was conducted with the following parameters: Effect size
ρ = 0.35,2 α = 0.05, power = 0.80.
For testing the research hypotheses, Pearson’s correla-
tions r were used. According to Cohen’s (1988) guide-
lines, a Pearson’s correlations r of 0.1 represents a small
effect, 0.3 represents a medium effect, and 0.5 represents
a large effect. Because of rather small variance on decen-
tering scores for the present sample, an Extreme Groups
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Approach (Preacher et al. 2005) was applied additionally.
Participants were split up into three decentering groups
by means of tertile split for each decentering subscale
separately. After this, only the lowest and the highest
tertiles, representing people with either ‘low’ or ‘high’
scores on decentering, were included in further analyses.
For these analyses of low and high decentering groups,
independent samples t-tests were conducted, investigat-
ing the differences of the respective variables between
these low and high decentering groups. For these analyses,
Effect sizes (ES) were calculated according to Cohen’s d
(1988) and corrected by means of Hedges and Olkins’ for-
mula (1985). ES of 0.2 to 0.5 represent a small effect, ES
of 0.5 to 0.8 represent a medium effect and ES above 0.8
represent a large effect.
Results
Relation of decentering to severity of depressive
symptoms and self-focussed attention
Means and standard deviations of the respective variables
and results of the Pearson’s correlations r investigating the
relationship between decentering, depressive symptoms, and
dysfunctional and functional self-focussed attention are pre-
sented in Table 1. All correlations were significant (p < 0.05).
Both decentering subscales, i.e. ASP and DP, showed
significant negative correlations with depressive symptoms.
This indicates that the higher participants scored on the
decentering measures, the lower they scored on the measure
of depressive symptoms. ASP and DP showed significant
negative correlations with dysfunctional self-focussed atten-
tion and significant positive correlations with functional self-
focussed attention. This indicates that participants scoring
higher on the decentering measures reported higher func-
tional and lower dysfunctional self-focussed attention.
Relationship between decentering and the ability to shift
and allocate attention
Means and standard deviations of the respective variables
and results of the Pearson’s correlations r investigating the
relationship between decentering and the two measures
for the ability to shift and allocate attention (INT and
Interference) are presented in Table 2. None of these
correlations reached significance (p > 0.05).
Relationship between decentering and metacognitive
monitoring ability
Means and standard deviations of the respective variables
and results of the Pearson’s correlations r investigating the
relationship between decentering and metacognitive
monitoring ability are presented in Table 3. None of these
correlations reached significance (p > 0.05).
Analyses of low and high decentering groups
Group sizes, means, and standard deviations of the three
tertiles are presented in Table 4.
Results of the t-tests exploring whether there is a sig-
nificant difference in the ability to shift and allocate at-
tention between the low and high decentering groups
are presented in Table 5. Means of the two groups did
not differ significantly concerning participants’ ability to
shift and allocate attention (p > 0.05).
Results of the t-tests exploring whether there is a sig-
nificant difference in metacognitive monitoring ability
between the low and high decentering groups are pre-
sented in Table 6. Means of the two groups did not sig-
nificantly differ concerning participants’ metacognitive
monitoring ability (p > 0.05).
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate the rela-
tion of decentering to severity of depressive symptoms,
self-focussed attention, as well as the ability to shift and
allocate attention and metacognitive monitoring in a
sample of healthy subjects. In line with our assumptions,
decentering was significantly associated with severity of
depressive symptoms and self-focussed attention. Contrary
to our expectations, results neither indicated a relationship
between decentering and attention ability, nor between
decentering and metacognitive monitoring ability. Results
of low and high decentering group analyses revealed
Table 1 Means (M), standard deviations (SD), and correlations representing the relationship between decentering, severity of depressive
symptoms and self-focussed attention
M (SD) 2 3 4 5
1 Accepting self-perceptiona 12.6 (2.1) .31* −.51** −.43** .40**
2 Distanced perspectivea 9.3 (2.6) – −.41** −.64** .39**
3 Depressive symptomsb −2.4 (0.8) – – .61** −.28*
4 Dysfunctional self-focussed attentionc 33.5 (8.4) – – – −.31*
5 Functional self-focussed attentionc 29.9 (4.2) – – – –
*p < 0.05
**p < 0.01
aassessed with the German version of the Experiences Questionnaire (EQ-D)
bassessed with the adaptive Rasch-based depression screening (A-DESC)
cassessed with the Questionnaire of Dysfunctional and Functional Self-Consciousness (DFS)
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similar findings. In the following sections, we will dis-
cuss our findings.
Relation of decentering to severity of depressive
symptoms and self-focussed attention
We hypothesized that a higher decentering ability would
be associated with less severe depressive symptoms,
and with lower dysfunctional and higher functional self-
focussed attention. Our results confirmed this hypothesis.
As it can be assumed that less severity of depressive symp-
toms and high functional self-focussed attention are
linked to mental health in general, our finding may sug-
gest that decentering is accompanied by general mental
health (e.g. Fresco et al. 2007a). Importantly, in the present
study relationships between decentering and depressive
symptoms emerged that are similar to results in prior inves-
tigations with healthy samples (e.g. Gecht et al. 2014a, b).
Decentering and attention
Pursuing considerations derived from the conceptualisa-
tion of decentering and based on research findings within
this field (e.g. Jha et al. 2007; Lutz et al. 2008; Moore and
Malinowski 2009), it was hypothesized that people with
higher decentering abilities would also show a higher
ability to shift and allocate attention. Against expectations,
results indicated that decentering was not significantly
associated with both of the acquired attention indices.
Instead, the present results are in line with Anderson et
al. (2007) and Van den Hurk et al. (2012), who could
not find a relation between mindfulness and diverse at-
tention processes, amongst others measured by means
of the Stroop test. These researchers argue that aware-
ness instead of attention, respectively a shift in attitude
towards an open and accepting stance (according to
one central component of mindfulness by Bishop et al.
(2004)) represents the central aspect of mindfulness. As
decentering is viewed as a central key mechanism facili-
tating a mindful state (Feldman et al. 2010; Gecht et al.
2014a; Hick and Chan 2010; Ong et al. 2012; Ortner et
al. 2007; Segal et al. 2002; Semple and Burke 2011; Sha-
piro et al. 2006; Tanay et al. 2012), it is assumable that
these findings are attributable to decentering. Overall, it
appears that in the present investigation the assumed ef-
fects of decentering might mainly be driven by an aware
state of mind and an accepting stance towards inner
mental events of the self rather than the ability to shift
and allocate attention.
In sum, the present results on the relationship between
decentering and attention lead to two possible conclu-
sions. The first possibility is that decentering and attention
are rather distinct and unrelated concepts. The other pos-
sibility is that the association between decentering and at-
tention performance only becomes evident in the aspect
of awareness and accepting stance towards own mental
events. This needs to be further clarified using additional
tasks focussing on attention performances that are af-
fected by self-relevant and emotionally valent stimuli.
Decentering and metacognitive monitoring
As by definition decentered people are ought to have meta-
cognitive abilities enabling them to monitor their thoughts
purposefully and non-judgmentally, it was hypothesized
that people scoring higher on decentering would have a
higher metacognitive monitoring ability. Results indicated
no significant relationship between decentering and meta-
cognitive monitoring ability.
As a possible explanation for this finding, it can be spec-
ulated that data did not reveal any association between
Table 2 Means (M), standard deviations (SD), and correlations
representing the relationship between decentering and
attention ability
M (SD) 2 3 4
1 Accepting self-perceptiona 12.6 (2.1) .31* −.13 −.09
2 Distanced perspectivea 9.3 (2.6) – .16 .23
3 Interference task (INT) 56.5 (8.8) – – .78**
4 Interferenceb 17.0 (5.6) – – –
*p < 0.05
**p < 0.01
aassessed with the German version of the Experiences Questionnaire (EQ-D)
bdifference in reaction time between the Stroop tasks Interference (INT) and
Colour Patches Naming (CPN)
Table 3 Means (M), standard deviations (SD), and correlations
representing the relationship between decentering and
metacognitive monitoring ability
M (SD) 2 3
1 Accepting self-perceptiona 12.6 (2.1) .31* .08
2 Distanced perspectivea 9.3 (2.6) – .12
3 Monitoring abilityb 19.9 (17.5) – –
*p < 0.05
aassessed with the German version of the Experiences Questionnaire (EQ-D)
bindexed as the absolute difference between judged and real Interference task
performance (INT)
Table 4 Group sizes (N), means (M), and standard deviations (SD)
of tertile splita on decentering subscalesb
N M SD
ASPc group 1 18 10.4 1.2
group 2 19 12.6 0.7
group 3 18 14.9 0.9
DPd group 1 18 6.3 1.5
group 2 19 9.4 0.7
group 3 18 12.0 1.5
agroup 1 = tertile with low decentering scores; group 2 = tertile with medium
decentering scores; group 3 = tertile with high decentering scores
bassessed with the German version of the Experiences Questionnaire (EQ-D)
csubscale accepting self-perception
dsubscale distanced perspective
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decentering and metacognitive monitoring ability, because
metacognitive monitoring as assessed in the present task
implicitly included some performance evaluation and not
just observing the own performance in a decentered way.
Nelson and Narens’ (1990) postulate in their metacogni-
tive framework, that metacognitive monitoring is always
linked with control processes in order to adapt behaviour.
Decentering, however, does not comprise evaluative or
adaptive processes. Possibly, as the associations between
decentering and metacognitive monitoring were not evi-
dent in our study, task performance might have predom-
inantly triggered control processes, which in turn could
have covered the assumed associations between decenter-
ing and monitoring ability.
Additionally, the distinction between metacognitive
insight and metacognitive knowledge made by Teasdale
(1999) in his Interacting Cognitive Subsystems framework
(ICS) can serve as a more refined perspective on how
decentering could relate to monitoring abilities. Metacog-
nitive insight, i.e. emotionally experiencing that thoughts
are not facts, is understood as a higher order mechanism
acting complementary to metacognitive knowledge, i.e.
just factually knowing that thoughts are not facts. It is
postulated that a decentered perspective or experiencing
mode is a form of metacognitive insight (Allen et al. 2006;
Teasdale et al. 2002). Metacognitive monitoring of cogni-
tive performance as assessed by the present task could
have predominantly triggered a form of factual meta-
cognitive knowledge instead of representing metacogni-
tive insight. Therefore, our results further suggest that
decentering could rather resemble the aspect of emotional
experience of the fact that own mental events are not real-
ity, thus a metacognitive insight mode. This might again
indicate that decentering involves being aware while mon-
itoring self-referential emotional aspects.
Similar to the relationship between decentering and at-
tention, two possible conclusions can be drawn from our
results regarding the association of decentering and
metacognitive monitoring. The first is that decentering
and metacognitive monitoring are unrelated concepts. The
second possibility is that the association between decenter-
ing and metacognitive monitoring becomes evident in the
aspect of self-referential emotional valence, as postulated
by Teasdale et al. (1999, 2002) in the concept of decenter-
ing as metacognitive insight, thus an emotionally experien-
cing mode. This aspect needs further clarification using
experimental tasks in which monitoring of self-referential
emotionally valent mental events would be assessed.
Table 5 Group sizes (N), means (M), standard deviations (SD), and results of the t-tests representing the difference in the ability to
shift and allocate attention between people with low (group 1) and high (group 3) scoresa on decentering based on tertile split of
the two decentering subscalesb, i.e. accepting self-perception (ASP) and distanced perspective (DP)
N M SD t p df ES
Tertile split ASP Interference task group 1 18 57.1 9.2 .95 .35 34 0.30
group 3 18 54.6 6.9
Interferencec group 1 18 17.1 6.3 .42 .68 34 0.14
group 3 18 16.3 4.8
Tertile split DP Interference task group 1 18 55.6 6.8 −.64 .52 34 −0.20
group 3 18 57.3 9.4
Interferencec group 1 18 15.2 3.1 −1.37 .18 34 −0.45
group 3 18 17.1 5.0
agroup 1 = tertile with low decentering scores; group 3 = tertile with high decentering scores
bassessed with the German version of the Experiences Questionnaire (EQ-D)
cdifference in reaction time between Stroop tasks Interference (INT) and Colour Patches Naming (CPN)
Table 6 Group sizes (N), means (M), standard deviations (SD), and results of the t-tests representing the difference in metacognitive
monitoring abilitya between people with low (group 1) and high (group 3) scoresb on decentering based on tertile split of the two
decentering subscalesc, i.e. accepting self-perception (ASP) and distanced perspective (DP)
N M SD t p df ES
Tertile split ASP Monitoring ability Group 1 18 16.3 10.3 −.79 .43 34 −0.26
Group 3 18 19.9 15.8
Tertile split DP Monitoring ability Group 1 18 15.4 8.7 −1.17 .25 34 −0.38
Group 3 18 22.1 23.0
aindexed as the absolute difference between judged and real Interference task performance (INT)
bgroup 1 = tertile with low decentering scores; group 3 = tertile with high decentering scores
cassessed with the German version of the Experiences Questionnaire (EQ-D)
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General discussion, strengths, and limitations
Having discussed our results in detail above, some gen-
eral aspects remain to be mentioned that might have
contributed to the interesting but unexpected findings.
Most generally speaking, decentering is of a complex na-
ture and definitions differ with emphasis on different
components that are in the focus of research interest
(Fresco et al. 2007a; Safran and Segal 1990). In the present
case, decentering ability, assessed by means of the EQ-D,
focussed on two aspects, which were the accepting self-
perception (ASP) and the distanced perspective (DP). As
such, decentering was neither significantly associated with
the here acquired attentional nor the metacognitive moni-
toring processes. Overall, it seems that the aspect of an
objective stance towards the self constitutes the central as-
pect of decentering. Therefore, decentering was rather re-
lated to processes like self-focussed attention. One major
strength of the present study is the successful operationa-
lization of decentering by means of the EQ-D. We could
show comparable variance of EQ-D items in the present
non-clinical sample to other studies assessing decentering
by means of the EQ in non-clinical samples (Fresco et
al. 2007a; Tanay et al. 2012).
Finally, some limitations have to be mentioned that
may be considered in future studies. The present study
was conducted with cross-sectional data acquired from a
non-clinical sample and without any manipulating inter-
vention, so no causal inferences should be drawn. Gen-
erally, a larger sample and an investigation in different,
also clinical samples with more variance on decentering
would be beneficial to further investigate possible mech-
anisms associated with decentering ability. Furthermore,
as the EQ was originally designed to measure therapeut-
ically induced changes (Fresco et al. 2007a), it could be
that items appeared rather unfamiliar to the investigated
healthy student sample (Gecht et al. 2014b), e.g. ‘I can
actually see that I am not my thoughts’. This could have
interacted with the likelihood of the participants to agree
to an item or not.
Conclusion and future directions
The present study is a first contribution to the investiga-
tion of possible mechanisms associated with decentering.
Results revealed that a higher decentering ability, opera-
tionalized by means of the EQ-D, was related to less se-
vere depressive symptoms, higher functional and lower
dysfunctional self-focussed attention. As it can be assumed
that these concepts are linked to general mental health,
our finding suggests that a higher decentering ability is ac-
companied by general mental health (Fresco et al. 2007a).
Unexpectedly, decentering was neither significantly
associated with the assessed attentional processes, nor
related to the here acquired metacognitive monitoring
abilities. Therefore, results suggest that decentering and
ability to shift and allocate attention as well as meta-
cognitive monitoring are not associated, at least as it is
operationalized in the present study. In conclusion, it
seemed that decentering is principally constituted by
self-focussed aspects highlighting its potential role
within the acquisition of a non-judging and objective
stance towards the self.
Future research is needed to distinguish and clarify the
underlying processes of decentering, and to further es-
tablish its role in relation to concepts like metacognition
and cognitive abilities, as well as considering other con-
cepts. A starting point would be stronger consideration
of the relevance of self-referential processes for decenter-
ing. To focus on the non-judgmental and accepting stance
towards the self could offer further insight into whether
this aspect may be an important aspect of decentering. In
order to further clarify its relation to cognitive and meta-
cognitive abilities, self-relevant autobiographical stimuli
within experimental tasks investigating these two pro-
cesses could be reasonable to gather more information
about the self-focussed aspect and its emotional valence
of decentering in relation to attention and monitoring
abilities. Finally, once having more clarity about the cen-
tral mechanisms of the concept decentering, investigating
and manipulating the degree of a person’s decentering
ability by brief interventions would elucidate whether its
underlying processes can be trained, leading to improve-
ments in decentering and on the long term to improving
mental health.
Endnotes
1Note that these Cronbach’s α values were calculated
on data of the present sample
2Note that in the light of previous studies which usually
found effect sizes > .4 (e.g. Fresco et al. 2007a, b; Gecht et
al. 2014a, b; Ortner et al. 2007) smaller effects were
expected here, resulting in a slightly more conservative
power analysis
Competing interests
I declare that authors have no potential competing interest concerning
submission of the manuscript “Exploring the relationship of decentering to
health related concepts and cognitive and metacognitive processes in a
student sample” to the Journal “BMC Psychology”.
Authors’ contributions
RK participated in the conceptualization, carried out the study, did the analyses
and drafted the manuscript. JG participated in the conceptualization and helped
to carry out the study. TF participated in the conceptualization and helped to
draft the manuscript. BD participated in the conceptualization. SG participated in
the conceptualization, and VM participated in the conceptualization and helped
to draft the manuscript. All authors approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgments
This research project was supported by the START-program of the medical
faculty of the RWTH Aachen University (grant number 691201). The funding
source was not involved in conducting the research. Approval for the study
was provided by the ethics committee of the medical faculty of the RWTH
Aachen University (EK148/11).
Kessel et al. BMC Psychology  (2016) 4:11 Page 8 of 10
Received: 19 June 2015 Accepted: 29 February 2016
References
Alberts HJEM, Thewissen R. The effect of a brief mindfulness intervention on
memory for positively and negatively valenced stimuli. Mindfulness. 2011;2(2):73–7.
doi:10.1007/s12671-011-0044-7.
Allen NB, Blashki G, Gullone E. Mindfulness-based psychotherapies: a review of
conceptual foundations, empirical evidence and practical considerations.
Aust N Z J Psychiatry. 2006;40(4):285–94. doi:10.1080/j.1440-1614.2006.01794.x.
Anderson ND, Lau MA, Segal ZV, Bishop SR. Mindfulness-based stress reduction and
attentional control. Clin Psychol Psychother. 2007;14(6):449–63. doi:10.1002/cpp.
544.
Barnhofer T, Crane C, Hargus E, Amarasinghe M, Winder R, Williams JM. Mindfulness-
based cognitive therapy as a treatment for chronic depression: a preliminary
study. Behav Res Ther. 2009;47(5):366–73. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2009.01.019.
Bäumler G. Farbe-Wort-Interferenztest (FWIT) nach J. R. Stroop. Göttingen: Hogrefe;
1985.
Bernstein A, Hadash Y, Lichtash Y, Tanay G, Sheperd K, Fresco DM. Decentering
and related constructs: a critical review and metacognitive processes model.
Perspect Psychol Sci. 2015;10(5):599–617. doi:10.1177/1745691615594577.
Bieling PJ, Hawley LL, Bloch RT, Corcoran KM, Levitan RD, Young LT, et al.
Treatment-specific changes in decentering following mindfulness-based
cognitive therapy versus antidepressant medication or placebo for prevention
of depressive relapse. J Consult Clin Psychol. 2012;80(3):365–72. doi:10.1037/
a0027483.
Bishop SR, Lau M, Shapiro S, Carlson L, Anderson ND, Carmody J, et al. Mindfulness:
a proposed operational definition. Clin Psychol Sci Pract. 2004;11(3):230–41.
doi:10.1093/clipsy.bph077.
Carmody J, Baer RA, Lykins ELB, Olendzki N. Empirical study of the mechanisms
of mindfulness in mindfulness-based stress reduction program. J Clin Psychol.
2009;65(6):613–26. doi:10.1002/jclp.20579.
Carson SH, Langer EJ. Mindfulness and self-acceptance. J Ration Emotive Cogn
Behav Ther. 2006;24(1):29–43. doi:10.1007/s10942-006-0022-5.
Chambers R, Lo BCY, Allen NB. The impact of intensive mindfulness training on
attentional control, cognitive style, and affect. Cogn Ther Res. 2008;32(3):303–22.
doi:10.1007/s10608-007-9119-0.
Cohen J. Statistical power analysis for the behavioural sciences. 2nd ed. Hillsdale:
Lawrence Earlbaum Associates; 1988.
Edwards JR. The study of congruence in organizational behavior research: critique
and a proposed alternative. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process. 1994;8(1):51–100.
Faul F, Erdfelder E, Lang A-G, Buchner A. G*Power3: a flexible statistical power
analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behav
Res Methods. 2007;39(2):175–91.
Feldman G, Greeson J, Senville J. Differential effects of mindful breathing, progressive
muscle relaxation, and loving-kindness meditation on decentering and negative
reactions to repetitive thoughts. Behav Res Ther. 2010;48(10):1002–11.
doi:10.1016/j.brat.2010.06.006.
Fjorback LO, Arendt M, Ornbol E, Fink P, Walach H. Mindfulness-based stress
reduction and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy – a systematic review
of randomized controlled trials. Acta Psychiatr Scand. 2011;124(2):102–19.
doi:10.1111/j.1600-0447.2011.01704.x.
Forkmann T, Boecker M, Norra C, Eberle N, Kircher T, Schauerte P, et al.
Development of an item bank for the assessment of depression in persons
with mental illnesses and physical diseases using Rasch analysis. Rehabil
Psychol. 2009;54(2):186–97. doi:10.1037/a0015612.
Forkmann T, Kroehne U, Wirtz M, Norra C, Baumeister H, Gauggel S, et al.
Adaptive screening for depression - recalibration of an itembank for the
assessment of depression in persons with mental and somatic diseases and
evaluation in a simulated computer-adaptive test environment. J Psychosom
Res. 2013;75(5):437–43. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychores.2013.08.022.
Fresco DM, Moore MT, van Dulmen MHM, Segal ZV, Ma SH, Teasdale JD, et al.
Initial psychometric properties of the experiences questionnaire: validation
of a self-report measure of decentering. Behav Ther. 2007aa;38(3):234–46.
doi:10.1016/j.beth.2006.08.003.
Fresco DM, Segal ZV, Buis T, Kennedy S. Relationship of posttreatment decentering
and cognitive reactivity to relapse in major depression. J Consult Clin Psychol.
2007bb;75(3):447–55. doi:10.1037/0022-006X.75.3.447.
Fresco DM, Flynn JJ, Mennin DS, Haigh EAP. Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy.
In: Herbert JD, Forman EM, editors. Acceptance and mindfulness in cognitive
behavior therapy: understanding and applying the new therapies. New Jersey:
John Wiley & Sons; 2011. p. 57–82. doi:10.1002/9781118001851.ch3.
Garland EL, Gaylord SA, Fredrickson BL. Positive reappraisal mediates the stress-
reductive effects of mindfulness: an upward spiral process. Mindfulness. 2011;
2(1):59–67. doi:10.1007/s12671-011-0043-8.
Gecht J, Kessel R, Forkmann T, Gauggel S, Drueke B, Scherer A, et al. A mediation
model of mindfulness and decentering: sequential psychological constructs
or one and the same? BMC Psychol. 2014aa;2(18):1–13. doi:10.1186/2050-
7283-2-18.
Gecht J, Kessel R, Mainz V, Gauggel S, Drueke B, Scherer A, et al. Measuring
decentering in self-reports: psychometric properties of the experiences
questionnaire in a German sample. Psychother Res. 2014bb;24(1):67–79.
doi:10.1080/10503307.2013.821635.
Grossman P, Niemann L, Schmidt S, Walach H. Mindfulness-based stress reduction
and health benefits: a meta-analysis. J Psychosom Res. 2004;57(1):35–43. doi:10.
1016/S0022-3999(03)00573-7.
Hayes SC. Acceptance and commitment therapy, relational frame theory, and the
third wave of behavioral and cognitive therapies. Behav Ther. 2004;35(4):639–65.
doi:10.1016/S0005-7894(04)80013-3.
Hedges LV, Olkin I. Statistical methods for meta-analysis. Orlando: Academic; 1985.
Hick SF, Chan L. Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for depression: effectiveness
and limitations. Soc Work Ment Health. 2010;8(3):225–37. doi:10.1080/
15332980903405330.
Hiller W, Zaudig M, Mombour W. Internationale Diagnosen Checklisten für
DSM-IV und ICD-10. Göttingen: Hogrefe; 1997.
Holmbeck GN, Li ST, Schurman JV, Friedman D, Coakley RM. Collecting and
managing multisource and multimethod data in studies of pediatric
populations. J Pediatr Psychol. 2002;27(1):5–18.
Hoyer J. Der Fragebogen zur dysfunktionalen und funktionalen Selbstaufmerksamkeit
(DFS): Theoretisches Konzept und Befunde zur Reliabilität und Validität.
Diagnostica. 2000;46(3):140–8. doi:10.1026//0012-1924.46.3.140.
Jha AP, Krompinger J, Baime MJ. Mindfulness training modifies subsystems of
attention. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci. 2007;7(2):109–19. doi:10.3758/CABN.7.
2.109.
Kabat-Zinn J. Wherever you go, there you are. New York: Hyperion; 1994.
Kahan TL, Sullivan KT. Assessing metacognitive skills in waking and sleep: a
psychometric analysis of the Metacognitive, Affective, Cognitive Experience
(MACE) questionnaire. Conscious Cogn. 2012;21(1):340–52. doi:10.1016/j.
concog.2011.11.005.
Keng SL, Smoski MJ, Robins CJ. Effects on mindfulness on psychological health: a
review of empirical studies. Clin Psychol Rev. 2011;31:1041–56. doi:10.1016/j.
cpr.2011.04.006.
Kenny MA, Williams JM. Treatment-resistant depressed patients show a good response
to Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy. Behav Res Ther. 2007;45(3):617–25.
doi:10.1016/j.brat.2006.04.008.
Kessel R, Gecht J, Forkmann T, Drueke B, Gauggel S, Mainz V. Metacognitive
monitoring of attention performance and its influencing factors. Psychological
Research. 2014;78(4):597–607. doi:10.1007/s00426-013-0511-y.
Kingston T, Dooley B, Bates A, Lawlor E, Malone K. Mindfulness-based cognitive
therapy for residual depressive symptoms. Psychol Psychother. 2007;80(2):193–203.
doi:10.1348/147608306X116016.
Koriat A. Metacognition and consciousness. In: Zelazo PD, Moscovitch M,
Thompson E, editors. The Cambridge handbook of consciousness. New York:
Cambridge University Press; 2007. p. 289–325.
Koriat A, Shitzer-Reichert R. Metacognitive judgments and their accuracy. In:
Chambres P, Izaute M, Marescaux P-J, editors. Metacognition process,
function and use. Norwell, Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publishers;
2002. p. 1–17. doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-1099-4_1.
Langer EJ, Moldoveanu M. The construct of mindfulness. J Soc Issues.
2000;56(1):1–9. doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00148.
Lebois LAM, Papies EK, Gopinath K, Cabanban R, Quigley KS, Krishnamurthy V, et al.
A shift in perspective: decentering through mindful attention to imagined
stressful events. Neuropsychologia. 2015;75:505–24. doi:10.1016/j.
neuropsychologia.2015.05.030.
Lutz A, Slagter HA, Dunne JD, Davidson RJ. Attention regulation and monitoring
meditation. Trends Cogn Sci. 2008;12(4):163–9. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.01.005.
MacLeod CM. Half a century of research on the Stroop effect: an integrative
review. Psychol Bull. 1991;109(2):163–203. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.109.2.163.
Mengelkamp C, Bannert M. Judgements about knowledge, searching for
factors that influence their validity. Electron J Res Educ Psychol. 2009;
7(17):163–90.
Kessel et al. BMC Psychology  (2016) 4:11 Page 9 of 10
Moore A, Malinowski P. Meditation, mindfulness and cognitive flexibility. Conscious
Cogn. 2009;18(1):176–86. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.12.008.
Nelson TO, Narens L. Metamemory: a theoretical framework and new findings. In:
Bower G, editor. The psychology of learning and motivation. New York:
Academic; 1990. p. 125–73.
Ong JC, Ulmer CS, Manber R. Improving sleep with mindfulness and acceptance:
a metacognitive model of insomnia. Behav Res Ther. 2012;50(11):651–60.
doi:10.1016/j.brat.2012.08.001.
Ortner CNM, Kilner SJ, Zelazo PD. Mindfulness meditation and reduced emotional
interference on a cognitive task. Motiv Emot. 2007;31(4):271–83. doi:10.1007/
s11031-007-9076-7.
Pagnini F, Philips D. Being mindful about mindfulness. Lancet Psychiatry.
2015;2(4):288–9. doi:10.1016/S2215-0366(15)00041-3.
Preacher KJ, Rucker DD, MacCallum RC, Nicewander WA. Use of the extreme groups
approach: a critical reexamination and new recommendations. Psychol Methods.
2005;10(2):178–92. doi:10.1037/1082-989X.10.2.178.
Safran JD, Segal ZV. Interpersonal process in cognitive therapy. New York: Basic
Books; 1990.
Schraw G, Roedel TD. Test difficulty and judgment bias. Mem Cogn. 1994;22(1):63–9.
Segal ZV, Williams JMG, Teasdale JD. Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for
depression: a new approach to preventing relapse. New York: Guilford Press;
2002.
Segal ZV, Williams JMG, Teasdale JD. Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for
depression (2nded). New York: Guilford Press; 2013.
Semple RJ, Burke CA. Mindfulness-based treatment for children and adolescents.
In: Kendall PC, editor. Child and adolescent therapy: cognitive-behavioral
procedures. 4th ed. New York: Guilford Press; 2011. p. 411–26.
Shapiro SL, Carlson LE, Astin JA, Freedman B. Mechanisms of mindfulness. J Clin
Psychol. 2006;62(3):373–86. doi:10.1002/jclp.20237.
Sheppard LC, Teasdale JD. How does dysfunctional thinking decrease during
recovery from major depression? J Abnorm Psychol. 2004;113(1):64–71.
doi:10.1037/0021-843X.113.1.64.
Slife BD, Weaver CA. Depression, cognitive skill, and metacognitive skill in problem
solving. Cognit Emotion. 1992;6(1):1–22. doi:10.1080/02699939208411055.
Tanay G, Lotan G, Bernstein A. Salutary proximal processes and distal mood and
anxiety vulnerability outcomes of mindfulness training: A pilot preventive
intervention. Behav Ther. 2012;43(3):492–505. doi:10.1016/j.beth.2011.06.003.
Teasdale JD. Metacognition, mindfulness and the modification of mood disorders.
Clin Psychol Psychother. 1999;6:146–55.
Teasdale JD, Moore RG, Hayhurst H, Pope M, Williams S, Segal ZV. Metacognitive
awareness and prevention of relapse in depression: Empirical evidence. J
Consult Clin Psychol. 2002;70(2):275–87. doi:10.1037/0022-006X.70.2.275.
Troy AS, Shallcross AJ, Davis TS, Mauss IB. History of mindfulness-based cognitive
therapy is associated with increased cognitive reappraisal ability. Mindfulness.
2012. Advance online publication. doi:10.1007/s12671-012-0114-5.
Van Aalderen JR, Donders AR, Giommi F, Spinhoven P, Barendregt HP, Speckens
AE. The efficacy of mindfulness-based cognitive therapy in recurrent
depressed patients with and without a current depressive episode: a
randomized controlled trial. Psychol Med. 2012;42(5):989–1001.
Van den Hurk PAM, van Aalderen JR, Giommi F, Donders RART, Barendregt HP,
Speckens AEM. An investigation of the role of attention in mindfulness-based
cognitive therapy for recurrently depressed patients. J Exp Psychopathol.
2012;3(1):103–20. doi:10.5127/jep.024811.
Van der Velden AM, Kuyken W, Wattar U, Crane C, Pallesen KJ, Dahlgaard J, et al.
A systematic review of mechanisms of change in mindfulness-based
cognitive therapy in the treatment of recurrent major depressive disorder.
Clin Psychol Rev. 2015;37:26–39. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2015.02.001.
Wenk-Sormaz H. Meditation can reduce habitual responding. Altern Ther Health
Med. 2005;11(2):42–58.
•  We accept pre-submission inquiries 
•  Our selector tool helps you to find the most relevant journal
•  We provide round the clock customer support 
•  Convenient online submission
•  Thorough peer review
•  Inclusion in PubMed and all major indexing services 
•  Maximum visibility for your research
Submit your manuscript at
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central 
and we will help you at every step:
Kessel et al. BMC Psychology  (2016) 4:11 Page 10 of 10
